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ABSTRACT 
Modal fictionalism is the thesis that possible worlds and possible 
individuals are fictitious entities of some kind or other and that the 
fictions about such entities are useful in so far as they are an aid to the 
analysis of our modal idioms. This essay should be seen as an attempt 
to defend a particular variety of modal fictionalism, a defense that falls 
into two main parts. 
The first-comprising chapters two and three-examines the 
different varieties of modal fictionalism put forward by Armstrong 
(1989) and Rosen (1990) and defends a modified version of the thesis. I 
conclude that there are problems associated with both theses. I then 
defend a modified version of Rosen's thesis that overcomes the 
qualms raised in the previous chapter. 
The second part-comprising chapters four and five-contrasts 
modal fictionalism with modal realism. I conclude that both the 
fictiona!ist and the realist face certain irresolvable problems. It is my 
contention, though, that the problems associated with the realist's 
thesis are far more worrying than those associated with the 
fictionalist' s thesis. 
I have also included a discussion of a paper by Harold Noonan 
(1994) in an appendix to this thesis. Noonan provides an alternative 
solution to some of the problems I raise in Chapter 2. 
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